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Certain people are at risk for using alcohol or other drugs excessively and for developing problemswith their use.
Their susceptibilitymight arise from a variety of factors, including their genetic make-up, brain chemistry, family
background, personality and other psychological variables, and environmental and sociocultural variables. More-
over, after substance use has become established, there are additional cognitive-motivational variables (e.g., sub-
stance-related attentional bias) that contribute to enacting behaviors consistent with the person's motivation to
acquire and use the substance. People who are at such risk are likely to choose to use addictive substances even
though doing so entails negative consequences. In the sense of complete freedom from being determined by
causal factors, we believe that there is no such thing as free will, but defined as ability to make choices from
amongmultiple options, even though the choices are ultimately governed by natural processes, addicted individ-
uals are free to choose. Although they might appear unable to exercise this kind of free will in decisions about
their substance use, addictive behaviors are ultimately always goal-directed and voluntary. Such goal pursuits
manifest considerable flexibility. Even some severely addicted individuals can cease their use when the value
of continuing the use abruptly declines orwhen the subjective cost of continuing the use is too great with respect
to the incentives in other areas of their lives. Formal treatment strategies (e.g., contingency management, Sys-
tematic Motivational Counseling, cognitive training) can also be used to facilitate this reversal.
© 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Free will can be characterized in a number of different ways. Accord-
ing to Baumeister's (2014) definition, resting on that of Haggard, Mele,
O'Connor, and Vohs (2010), free will is “the capacity for free action
[whichmeans] that the person could do different things in the same sit-
uation” (p. 236). This definition is susceptible to varying interpretations.
First, one could take “could do” tomean that nothing in the physical en-
vironment or range of the person's physical capabilities could prevent
the alternative actions and that there are no other constraints. A second
interpretation of “could do”might focus on the process of choosing and
rule out self-destructive choices that run strongly contrary to the
chooser's values, such as drawing a gun on police officers (assuming
that suicide is not valued positively) or publicly engaging in behavior
that would inevitably be viewed by others as offensive, such as violating
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one's society's strict codes of dress or conduct (assuming that theperson
positively values social acceptance).
The distinction between these two interpretations is between free
will in the sense of choosing according to one's preferences without re-
gard to situational constraints, such as social pressure, versus in the
sense of choosing according to one's preferences realistically, that is, in
light of the foreseeable consequences, given the situational opportuni-
ties and constraints, if any. In otherwords, the exercise of freewill is con-
strued in the present article as choosing from among actions that are
feasible given the existing physical limitations or insuperable social con-
straints. The physical constraints include those imposed by the limita-
tions of brain functions, including brain pathologies (Fenton & Wiers,
2016) but also by the “balance between impulsive and reflective pro-
cesses” (Wiers, Field, & Stacy, 2014, p. 39) that may be the result of
the addictive substance itself. Otherwise, however, choices are deter-
mined by additional causal factors, such as reward sensitivity (Jonker
et al., 2016; van Hemel-Ruiter, de Jong, Ostafin, & Wiers, 2015), execu-
tive processes such as goal inhibition (Goldstein, Volkow, Wang,
Fowler, & Rajaram, 2001; van Hemel-Ruiter et al., 2015; Wiers,
Boelema, Nikolaou, & Gladwin, 2015), goal motivation, goal value, and
even goal prediction and availability (Volkow, Fowler, & Wang, 2004),
memory associations (Ames et al., 2014) for the addictive behavior rel-
ative to associations for alternative goals to choose from, and, the alter-
native goals' values (Kalivas & Volkow, 2005), availability, and levels of
automaticity. Ambivalence attributable to conflicts between foreseeable
outcomes of a decision, for example between brief strong enjoyment
and subsequent loss of an alternative opportunity, may render a deci-
sion difficult to make. It is nevertheless made “freely” in the sense of
free will employed here.
A third possibility might be to interpret “could do” as making choices
free from psychological determinants of action. Such determinants
would include genetic determinants of neural and hormonal functions
and situational elicitations of behavioral responses that have been previ-
ously shaped by environmental influences. This interpretation of freewill
would, however, deny a role for causality. It would accordingly be incon-
sistent with scientific understanding of human behavior (see also Baer,
Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008). In this latter sense, free will would not,
from a conventionally deterministic scientific viewpoint, exist.
A critic might point to the human capacity for originality, for think-
ing of creative solutions, even surprising ones, including circumventing
seemingly daunting obstacles to a goal pursuit. Having created a solu-
tion, the person then continues the goal pursuit in the newly indicated
direction. From a scientific perspective, such solutions would result
from previously established associative pathways in the brain, perhaps
along with quasi-random confluences of stimuli that might lead to
experiencing those associations in newways. That is, the original or cre-
ative insights would still have been determined by the flow of prior
events. In what sense, then, does this portray freelywilled action?
Baumeister (2014) also noted that causality takes place at a variety
of levels, from the atomic to the social; that the path from one level to
another is often hard to trace; and that there is often a probabilistic fac-
tor that defies precise prediction of outcomes. None of these consider-
ations, however, seems determinative regarding the existence of free
will. The fact that at this time the relationships between levels are poor-
ly understood cannot demonstrate the existence of freewill. Neither can
the existence of unexplainable probabilistic variation, inasmuch as will
presumably directs behavior stably at particular outcomes that have
certain properties of value and probability of attainability, as described
briefly in a subsequent section. Does it make sense to equate “free”
with irreducibly unexplainable?
In considering the role of free will in addiction, it is necessary to
make some important distinctions. One of these is between free will
and conscious choice, or conscious will, as Wegner (2002) puts it. It is
entirely possible to view the causal chain that leads to actions, such as
imbibing addictive substances, as either determined by concrete, pre-
dictive precursors or as freely chosen, unpredictable courses of action,
without committing to a position regarding the role of consciousness.
Therefore, the very useful discussions regarding the causal role of con-
sciousness in choice or will (e.g., Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs,
2011, 2015) are not necessarily relevant to the consideration of freewill.
It should also be noted, however, that individuals' preferences to en-
gage in one behavior versus another will have been shaped by their ge-
netic endowment in interaction with their past experiences. As
discussed in the next section, scientific advances now permit specifying
physiological, psychological, and cultural differences among individuals,
which together shape their preferences regarding their use of addictive
substances.Whether onewishes to characterize the resulting choices as
truly “free” depends on howone understands such freedom. Yes, people
generally have a number of possible choices before them, in which case
their choices are made freely, but in our view their ultimate choices are
formed by the various physical and experiential determinants that we
later describe.
In any event, to say that their choices have been predetermined is in
no way inconsistent with the view that people can think critically and
can often devise creative, even surprising solutions for reaching their
goals. After all, individuals' patterns of thought, including their associa-
tive pathways that affect their creative solutions, rest on a foundation of
brain functions and previous experiences that enable them to envision
and map out their futures.
To obtain a sense of how free will is experienced in everyday life,
Stillman, Baumeister, and Mele (2011) asked undergraduate student
volunteers to describe instances in which their actions reflected the ex-
ercise of freewill and other instances inwhich freewill was not a factor,
as, for instance, when the action was perceived as completed under du-
ress. Raters then assessed the narratives with regard to a set of dimen-
sions. The characteristic that best distinguished the two classes of
action was described as goal attainment, which was rated much higher
in narratives of freely chosen actions than in narratives of more
constrained actions. This finding meshes nicely with the goal theory of
current concerns (e.g., Klinger & Cox, 2011), which avoids pondering
the concept of freedom of will but recognizes the centrality of goal pur-
suits in the brain's architecture andmore broadly in the capacity for sur-
vival of members of the animal kingdom.
The sections that follow explore what is known about the motiva-
tional factors and constraints regarding alcohol use. It does so in order
to assess the extent towhich excessive alcohol consumption can be con-
sidered a free choice versus one over which the drinker lacks control.
1. The value of drinking alcohol
Cox and Klinger (1988, 1990, 2004, 2011a) have proposed amotiva-
tional model of alcohol use. The model summarizes the major variables
that contribute to—or detract from—the value of drinking alcohol, and it
shows how these variables pass through a motivational track that cul-
minates in a person's decision to drink—or not to drink—alcohol. The de-
cision to drink, or not to do so, is voluntary in the sense that the drinker
can exercise control over it. Nevertheless, the nature of the control is it-
self predictable and determined. That is, for example, insofar as vari-
ables that increase the value of drinking alcohol apply to a particular
individual, weightwill be added to that person's decisions to drink alco-
hol as opposed to not doing so. Conversely, if variables that detract from
the value of drinking alcohol apply to an individual, weight will be
added to this person's decisions not to drink.
It is important to clarify how value is defined in the science of moti-
vation. Incentives are the objects, events, or situations that have positive
or negative value, in the sense that a personwould like to get, obtain, or
retain them (in the case of positive incentives), or the personwould like
to prevent, avoid, or be free of them (in the case of negative incentives).
The value attributed to an incentive is, therefore, the expectation that a
desirable change in the person's feeling—i.e., his or her affect—will occur
if he or she acquires a positive incentive or gets rid of a negative incen-
tive. Drinking alcohol might be a positive incentive for one person; it
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might be a negative incentive for another person; or itmore likelymight
have both positive and negative value for the same individual.
In the following sections, we discuss the major categories of
variables that contribute to the positive or negative value of drink-
ing alcohol. These variables include biological, sociocultural, envi-
ronmental, and psychological factors. When, as a result of the
influence of these variables, a person highly values drinking alco-
hol, there is a strong likelihood that he or she will choose to
drink. In our view, this person will have freely (in the limited
sense described above) decided to drink, even though the decision
might be neither prudent nor healthy.
On a terminological note, it is important to recognize that the term
addiction is descriptive and predictive but not explanatory. It labels a
likelihood of repeated behaviors of a certain kind, typically behaviors
disapproved of by the user of the term and most likely carrying serious
disadvantages for the addicted individual, at least in the view of the per-
son using the term addicted. The addictive behavior is commonly also
ascribed to the addict's inability to cease use, but addiction reflects like-
lihood of choices, not lack of capability to act.
2. Drinking alcohol tends to run in families
It has long been recognized that excessive drinking and alcohol
problems tend to run in families (Orford, 1984). However, the similarity
in drinking patterns among familymembers could be due to (a) various
environmental factors within the family context (Orford, 1984) that
help to define the value of drinking for a particular family, (b) genetic
factors that help to determine the extent to which drinking alcohol is
pleasurable or aversive, or (c) the interaction between environmental
and genetic factors. In an effort to separate the relative contribution of
environmental and genetic factors to the development of alcohol use
disorders (AUDs), studies have compared the prevalence of AUDs in
monozygotic and dizygotic twins who were reared by their biological
parents with those who were reared by adoptive parents. In a meta-
analysis of these studies, Verhulst, Neale, and Kendler (2015) concluded
that the heritability of AUDs is substantially greater than the proportion
of shared environmental variance (0.49 versus 0.10).
But what is transmitted genetically that could cause an AUD to devel-
op? Efforts are underway to identify the specific variations on the human
genome that contribute to the genetic risk for AUDs (e.g., Juraeva et al.,
2015; Yan et al., 2014; Ystrom, Kendler, & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014).
Although progress has been made, the exact determinants of genetic
risk for AUDs are not yet fully understood. Nevertheless, some conclu-
sions can be drawn. For instance, the degree to which alcohol affects
the neurotransmitters in the brain seems to be partly genetically deter-
mined (Tabakoff & Hoffman, 2013). For some individuals, alcohol might
strongly reduce anxiety through the release of gamma-aminobutyric
acid (GABA). For other people, drinking alcohol might strongly enhance
reward-related stimuli through the release of dopamine (Berridge,
2007). Another reaction to alcohol that is likely genetically determined
is the alcohol flush reaction (Dickson, James, Heath, et al., 2006). It in-
cludes a variety of unpleasant bodily reactions in peoplewith a deficiency
in aldehyde dehydrogenase—the enzyme that metabolizes acetaldehyde
(the toxic firstmetabolite of alcohol)—when they drink alcohol. The alco-
hol flush reaction seems to be genetically determined in that deficits in
aldehydedehydrogenase are commonamong people of East Asian ances-
try, unlike those of European ancestry (Dickson et al., 2006).
The various biochemical reactions to alcohol described here affect
the value that individual drinkers place on drinking alcohol, either in-
creasing or decreasing the degree of reward that a person derives
from drinking alcohol. Again, when an individual attributes great
value to drinking alcohol, that person will likely choose to drink.
It is a decision that is freely made (in the limited sense described
above) on the basis of the payoff that this person expects to derive
from drinking.
3. Sociocultural and environmental influences
The value that a person attributes to drinking alcohol is also strongly
influenced by the society inwhich the person lives (Greenfield & Room,
1997; Orford, 2001; Room, 2013; Wild, 2002). For instance, the society
helps to define the circumstances in which it is appropriate to drink
and how much alcohol should be drunk. Individuals within a society
are explicitly and implicitly reinforcedwhen their drinking corresponds
to the societal norms, and they are explicitly and implicitly censured
when their own drinking deviates from societal norms. These societal
reactions to an individual's drinking help to solidify the value that
each person places on drinking alcohol.
The differences in societal views about drinking are reflected in the
patterns of alcohol consumption within particular countries. For exam-
ple, an international study of heavy drinking among university students
(Dantzer, Wardle, Fuller, Pampalone, & Steptoe, 2006) found that uni-
versity students in some southern European countries (e.g., Italy, France,
Greece) had low rates of heavy episodic drinking compared to students
in some of the northern European countries (viz., Belgium, Ireland, Po-
land, Netherlands, Slovakia) and in North America (e.g., United States)
and South America (e.g., Columbia). There were, however, exceptions
to the general conclusion about the difference between northern and
southern European countries in the rates of heavy drinking. For exam-
ple, students in Germany, like those in Italy, had a low rate. Similar to
the results of other studies, in school-based surveys from 13 European
countries, Kuntsche et al. (2015) found that adolescents from southern
and central Europe drankmore frequently than those fromnorthern Eu-
rope, but adolescents from northern European countries reported being
intoxicatedmore frequently. The cultural differences in drinking seemed
to be due to stronger social (e.g., “because it helps you enjoy a party”),
enhancement (e.g., “because you like the feeling”), and coping (e.g., “be-
cause it helps you when you feel depressed or nervous”) motives for
drinking in northern Europe than in southern and central Europe.
In addition to cultural attitudes about drinking within a society, en-
vironmental influences also affect the value that individuals place on
drinking alcohol. Taxes and advertisements of alcohol are two such in-
fluences. For instance, it has been demonstrated that within particular
countries, increases in taxes on alcohol lead to reductions in alcohol
consumption generally and reductions specifically in binge and other
kinds of excessive drinking that carry negative health-related conse-
quences (Staras, Livingston, Christou, Jernigan, & Wagenaar, 2014;
Xuan et al., 2015). Presumably, raising taxes on alcoholic beverages re-
duces money that might otherwise be used to purchase other positively
valued goods and services or requiring additional negatively valued
work to purchase them, thus increasing drinkers' ambivalence about
drinking. Reductions in taxes, on the other hand, are associated with in-
creases in consumption and consequent increases in alcohol-related
morbidity and mortality (Zatoński, Sulkowska, Zatoński, Herbeć, &
Muszyńska, 2015). In other words, tax increases lower the net value of
drinking alcohol, thereby making it more likely that individuals will
control their drinking; reductions in taxes have the opposite effect.
The goal of alcohol advertisements is, of course, to increase the at-
tractiveness of drinking alcohol (i.e., its value), thereby increasing the
amount of alcohol that people consume. Various research studies have
clearly demonstrated that there is, in fact, a direct relationship between
the amount of alcohol that people consume and their exposure to alco-
hol advertisements. This relationship, for example, has been demon-
strated among underage drinkers with regard both to the amount of
alcohol and the particular brands that they consume (Morgenstern,
Isensee, Sargent, & Hanewinkel, 2011; Ross et al., 2014; Ross et al.,
2015; Siegel et al. cited by Barry [2], 2015; Siegel et al., 2016), and it
has also been shown that alcohol advertisements influence young
people's perceptions of the normativeness of drinking (Martino et al.,
2016). Conversely, restrictions on alcohol advertisements have been
found to be inversely associated with the prevalence of hazardous
drinking (Bosque-Prous et al., 2014).
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Any of these sociocultural and environmental influences that add
weight to the positive value that a person expects to derive from drink-
ing alcohol will make it more likely that the person will actually decide
to drink. Again, however, we emphasize that the decision is made vol-
untarily in the sense that nothing in the environment coerces it (Cox
& Klinger, 1988, 1990, 2004, 2011a. This view is consistent with the
view that addiction is a special case of—rather than an exception
to—normal motivational processes (Köpetz, Lejuez, Wiers, &
Kruglanski, 2013; Lewis, 2017; Orford, 2001), even in the case that the
resulting behavior appears to be self-destructive (Köpetz et al., 2013).
4. Personality and other psychological factors
A personality characteristic that has often been identified as a risk
factor for alcohol and other substancemisuse is behavioral disinhibition
(Bogg & Finn, 2010)—particularly in the form of impulsivity (Harnett,
Lynch, Gullo, Dawe, & Loxton, 2013; Loxton, Bunker, Dingle, & Wong,
2015; Mackinnon, Kehayes, Clark, Sherry, & Stewart, 2014; Mikheeva
& Tragesser, 2016; Thompson, Roemer, & Leadbeater, 2015; Wood,
Dawe, & Gullo, 2013). Another such characteristic is negative emotion-
ality (Mackinnon et al., 2014; Mikheeva & Tragesser, 2016). Impulsive
individuals value drinking alcohol for the enhancement that it brings;
depressed and anxious individuals value drinkingbecause they perceive
that it will alleviate their negative emotions.
Another factor that determines the value that drinking alcohol has
for a particular individual is the other incentives in the person's life
that are available, or potentially available, for the person to pursue
and enjoy. Excessive drinkers, including those who develop an AUD,
seem explicitly or implicitly to compare the value that they attribute
to drinking alcohol with the value that they can derive from incentives
in other areas of their lives (Cox & Klinger, 2011a). The chemical effects
that drinkers seek to achieve from drinking alcohol occur rapidly, and
the satisfaction that could be achieved from more distant goals might
seem relatively unattractive, especially to drinkers who exhibit delay
discounting, i.e., thosewhodisproportionately devalue delayed rewards
(Moody, Franck, Hatz, & Bickel, 2016). In fact, it has been demonstrated
that as perceived access to other incentives decreases, people's motiva-
tion to drink alcohol increases (e.g., Vuchinich & Tucker, 1996, 1998).
Additionally, it has been shown that problematic drinkers aremore like-
ly to resolve their drinking problem if they have a satisfying life and ad-
equate resources for coping with frustrations (Cox, Schippers, Klinger,
et al., 2002; Moos & Moos, 2007; Murphy, Correia, Colby, & Vuchinich,
2005; Tucker, Roth, Vignolo, & Westfall, 2009; Tucker, Vuchinich,
Black, & Rippens, 2006). In short, drinkers who previously had a drink-
ing problem have been able to resolve it if they perceive that that they
have access to sufficiently compelling competing incentives. Their deci-
sion to give up drinking would have been made in the same voluntary
manner as their earlier decisions to imbibe. Specifically, it would have
beenmade when drinkers came to view the downside of drinking alco-
hol as outweighing the value of continuing to drink. Such a decision
might be made even among people who are severely addicted.
5. Are addictive behaviors motivated or automatic? A
false dichotomy1
One property frequently attributed to addiction is automaticity. That
is, the behavior, such as alcohol consumption, follows uncontrollably
from given circumstances. That property would appear to abrogate
free will. What follows examines this idea as it applies to alcohol use.
To begin with, addictive behaviors aremalleable with regard to both
their forms and probability of occurrence. They are, like other behaviors
beyond simple reflexes, goal-directed, and voluntary (see also, e.g.,
Heyman, 2009). That is, addicted individuals can voluntarily modify
their instrumental acts to accord with what is needed to obtain addic-
tive substances in particular circumstances. Notwithstanding contrary
opinions in the field that addictive behaviors, or at least some of their
components, are automatic and beyond voluntary control, the evidence
indicates that they are modifiable.
Automatic suggests that under given conditions a response has a
high probability of occurring. It may also include acts that originate
through unconscious processes (Huang & Bargh, 2014). Some authors
(e.g., Feil et al., 2010) use the term “compulsive” to describe addictive
instrumental (e.g., “seeking”) and consummatory (e.g., “taking”;
Vanderschuren & Everitt, 2005) actions.
Such terms imply mechanical rigidity, but the literature indicates
that behaviors associated with addiction are nevertheless modifiable.
For example, automaticity is perhapsmost often attributed to attention-
al biases. Yet such alcohol-related behaviors, though viewed as auto-
matic action tendencies, can be changed through cognitive bias
modification (Cox, Fadardi, Hosier, & Pothos, 2015; Wiers, Eberl, Rinck,
Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011) and mindfulness treatment (e.g.,
Witkiewitz, Lustyk, & Bowen, 2013). Evidence also indicates that most
people who change their substance use do so on their ownwithout for-
mal treatment (e.g., Bischof, Rumpf, & John, 2012).
This is not to deny that ending or even moderating substance use
may be difficult, often excruciatingly so. There is evidence of brain prop-
erties associated with addiction that may deepen the difficulty (Holton
& Berridge, 2013; Koob, 2006). Repeated consumption of the addictive
substance appears to shift value from consummation to procurement
of the addictive substance and to reduce the subjective value of more
natural kinds of rewards, such as food and social interaction (Kalivas &
Volkow, 2005).
Nevertheless, in other respects addictions result from processes of
the kind that produce strivings for high-value goals in general. That
they are so highly valued gives at least the persistence and intensity of
these goal pursuits the appearance of automaticity. However, goal-di-
rectedness is particularly characterized by responding to obstacles by
altering one's responses, whether by increasing sheer forcefulness or
trying novel approaches to circumvent the obstacles. Pioneer researcher
Wolfgang Köhler (1925) labeled this response flexibility Umweg (de-
tour) behavior.
The goal theory of current concerns, from its first formulations, rec-
ognized this principle by labeling the first stage following an encounter
with an obstacle the invigoration stage (Klinger, 1975, 1977). When in
need, addicts regularly display such detour behavior in the sometimes
ingenious ways they find for obtaining or concealing their substances,
such as diverting them from hospital stores and patients.
One route to apparent automaticity is repetition of goal-directed be-
havioral sequences. Frequently repeating sequences of initially separate
actions integrates their action units into longer, relatively seamless action
streams that require little conscious control to unfold, as in skilled playing
of a musical instrument. However, opposing this kind of automatization
(i.e., response integration, Klinger, 1971) to goal-directedness creates a
false dichotomy. Even integrated action sequences are subject to modifi-
cation according to circumstances, as when a violinist in a public perfor-
mance voluntarily changes fingering to compensate for a suddenly
broken string. Of course, such flexibility depends on a degree of practice
and knowledge, but the point here is that the behavior is ruled by the de-
sire to optimize attainment of goals and is not simply mechanical.
Another general principle is that having chosen to pursue a goal alters
cognitive processing, beginningwith changes in the individual's priorities
for processing stimuli (Klinger, 1978, 2013). People become more atten-
tive to all kinds of goal-related cues and are more likely to recall them
and to think about them spontaneously. Consistentwith this principle, al-
cohol addicts give processing priority to alcohol-related cues (Cox,
Fadardi, & Pothos, 2006). These in turn further whet appetites for alcohol
consumption (Cox et al., 2006; Field & Cox, 2008; Field, Duka, Tyler, &
Schoenmakers, 2009a; Field, Munafo, & Franken, 2009b). A similar pro-
cess operates with regard to food. Importantly from the standpoint of1 For an extended discussion of this topic, see Cox, Klinger, and Fadardi (2017).
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modifiability, interferingwith goal-related imagery reduces consumption
(May, Kavanagh, & Andrade, 2015). Addicts also display heightened delay
discounting, inwhich rewards of ostensibly equal general value for the in-
dividual are treated as ifmore valuable the sooner that they canbeobtain-
ed. In the case of alcohol use, delay of potentially rewarding alternative
activities thus discounts their value (see Cox et al., 2002; Noël, Bechara,
Brevers, Verbanck, & Campanella, 2010).
The theory presented here shares some features with dual-process
models of addiction (e.g., Moss & Albery, 2009; Wiers, Cox, Field, et al.,
2006) in which automatic processes such as addiction-related atten-
tional bias and controlled processes (deliberate responses) are both in-
volved in addictive behaviors. Although both kinds of processes play a
role in decisions about using an addictive substance, the decision, how-
ever conflicted and difficult, is in our view always ultimately under the
person's voluntary control and remains goal-directed. The evidence sug-
gests only that the drug-seeking behavior can become repetitive. Seek-
ing a target (i.e., a goal object or event) such as an addictive substance
remains under conscious control even if it is a habitual, seemingly au-
tomatized behavioral sequence triggered by internal or external cues.
As we have argued, addiction reflects a major shift in the relative in-
centive values of the substances that have attained the status of an
individual's goal objects, both substance-related and other ones. In ac-
cordance with Expectancy X Value decision theory (Van Eerde &
Thierry, 1996), this shift changes decisions and renders it more difficult
(i.e., less likely) for a person to stop pursuing the addictive goal. As incen-
tives and goals change in potency and nature (e.g., Kalivas & Volkow,
2005), the direction of decision-making also changes. Nevertheless, al-
though values affect voluntary choices, the addictive behaviors are di-
rectly controlled by those voluntary choices rather than being purely
pharmacologically, quasi-robotically controlled acts (see also Heyman,
1996, 2013; Russell & Davies, 2009). It is of interest that the extent to
which interviewed drug users subsequently reduce their use is predicted
by the extent towhich they express commitment to such change in their
interviews (Amrhein, Miller, Yahne, Palmer, & Fulcher, 2003).
Consistent with this view, even severely addicted individuals may un-
dergo natural remissionwhen further changes in values and expectancies
produce the decision that the benefits of changing their addictive behav-
ior outweigh the emotional costs of continuing the consumption of the
addictive substance (Bischof et al., 2012). Addictive behaviors can, there-
fore, also succumb to the behavior-shaping administration of rewards and
punishments as, for example, by applying contingency management
treatments (Stitzer & Petry, 2006). Another approach thatworks onmod-
ifying the value and expectancy components of goal choices, Systematic
Motivational Counseling (Cox & Klinger, 2011b), has also been found to
generate changes in patterns of use (Cox et al., 2003; Fuhrmann,
Schroer, & Jong-Meyer, 2011). The section that follows reviews the re-
search on addiction-related cognitive biases and their modification, with
resulting changes in consumption of substances.
6. Cognitive automaticity and free choice
The previous sections discussed how choices are intertwined with
goal setting, goalmanagement, and goal pursuits. Usually, even if people
wish to, they cannot simply copy and paste ways of doing things. It is,
however, also true that the majority of the daily activities that people
undertake, even those involving preferences for food, art, sports,
movies, and so on, follow an algorithm that has been established in
the brain. The more often one repeats the behavior, the more
established it becomes. This section discusses selective evidence on au-
tomatic cognitive processes that are not under conscious control and
how they are related to decision-making and goal-seeking behaviors.
The evidence described here challenges people's desire to implement
their free will, especially with regard to well-established addictive be-
haviors, which entail strong emotions.
The emotionality that is associated with goal pursuits (referred to as
value) has a great impact on the cognitive system, and the relationship is
reciprocal. In fact, theories and research suggest that sometimes deci-
sions are totally intuitive or based on nonconscious inner (visceral) de-
sires (see Dunn, Evans, Makarova, White, & Clark, 2012; M. J. Robinson,
Fischer, Ahuja, Lesser, & Maniates, 2016).
With reference to one variety of apparent automatization, T. E. Rob-
inson and colleagues (Robinson& Berridge, 1993, 2000, 2001, 2008) ex-
plained how repeating drug-use behaviors leads to alterations in the
brain's reward circuits. They coined the term incentive sensitization to
refer to these goal-specific brain pathways. M. J. Robinson et al. (2016)
also argued that when incentive sensitization develops into wanting
an object, i.e., experiencing a visceral desire for it (i.e., a nonconscious,
inner desire), this initiates a behavioral chain of goal pursuits even in
the absence of liking the object of the goal. Such visceral wanting can
be triggered by sheer exposure to cues that are associated with the
goal, which in the case of addictive behaviors might be stimuli related
to alcohol, drugs, or forbidden food. This view is consistent with
Tiffany's (1999) conclusion from reviewing cue-reactivity studies that
cues can actually elicit visceral reactions, and that conscious feelings of
craving are not a necessary part of substance use or of relapse (Wray,
Gass, & Tiffany, 2013).
Executive cognitive functioning (ECF) is also important in emotion
regulation and goal-related behaviors. Within ECF, two subsystems
have been identified, each with distinctive, but to some extent overlap-
ping, neural substrates that are involved in decision-making and moti-
vated behavior. One is a so-called hot cognitive system, which is
responsible for regulating affect, emotions, and behavior that ismotivat-
ed toward achieving a valued goal (i.e., an incentive). The other is a so-
called cold cognitive system, which is responsible for regulating less af-
fective, abstract, and non-contextual tasks and problem solving (Dolcos
& McCarthy, 2006; Hongwanishkul, Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005;
Iordan, Dolcos, & Dolcos, 2013).
There is evidence that overlapping brain regions are involved in both
of these systems, but hot ECF has been found to be more strongly asso-
ciated with the orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial regions, both of
which are connected to limbic areas that are associated with emotional
and social processing. Cold ECF, on the other hand, is more strongly as-
sociated with dorsolateral prefrontal areas (Tsermentseli & Poland,
2016). There is evidence from neurocognitive research that people
with a history of alcohol or other substance abuse have poorer cognitive
and brain functioning related to both hot and cool ECF (Moreno-Lopez
et al., 2012). Insofar as this suggests a possible causal connection, it indi-
cates that alcohol and other drug abuse may impair the brain's loci that
are responsible for a wide range of ECF, including inhibition, task
switching, sustained attention, decision making, and planning (de la
Monte & Kril, 2014; Smith, Simon Jones, Bullmore, Robbins, & Ersche,
2014; Terrett et al., 2014; Vonmoos et al., 2014). Such impairment
may reduce the individual's ability to voluntarily inhibit or deflect par-
ticular goal pursuits.
Surprisingly, evidence suggests that the adverse effects of chemicals
on the brain's executive functions can be traced to embryonic life. In one
study, six-to-nine-year-old children whose mothers smoked during
their pregnancy showed poorer performance on a task measuring hot
ECF than childrenwhosemothers were also smokers but who refrained
from smoking during their pregnancy (Huijbregts, Warren, de
Sonneville, & Swaab-Barneveld, 2008). These authors also observed a
dose–response relationship in the children's performance. However,
as far as impulsivity and disinhibition are concerned, a genetic factor
could also be implicated in view of the fact that themothers of children
with better ECF were able to successfully refrain from smoking during
their pregnancy.
It is interesting that anticipation of goal-related outcomes is mainly
processed in amygdala in interaction with orbital prefrontal and anteri-
or cingulate cortex. Moreover, the interactions among these structures
affect one's cue reactivity, attentional bias, and response selections
(Baxter, Parker, Lindner, Izquierdo, & Murray, 2000; Murray, 2007).
Therefore, a mixture of habit development and adverse effects of the
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abused chemicals on the brain contribute subtly to cognitive processes
that underlie making decisions about whether to consume an addictive
substance. Such nonconscious cognitive processes have been classified
into twomajor types of biases: (a) attentional bias, and (b) interpretive
bias Both of these can be construed as a kind of automatization. Howev-
er, as indicated later, this does not necessarily indicate that they are
unmodifiable.
7. Attentional bias
Attentional bias for substance-related stimuli is one's tendency to
readily perceive and attend to stimuli in the environment that are relat-
ed to the person's substance use. It also can be construed as an automa-
tized phenomenon, but, again, it turns out to bemalleable. Furthermore,
it parallels, and can be considered a particular instance of, attentional
bias toward cues associated with any significant personal goal (Cox et
al., 2006).
Attentional bias tasks are based on either facilitation or interference
effects. Facilitation refers to easier detection of salient stimuli (e.g., a
bottle of wine) among other kinds of stimuli (e.g., a bottle of a nonalco-
holic beverage). Interference, by contrast, refers to difficulty in turning
one's attention away from a salient stimulus (e.g., a bottle of wine)
and paying attention to another kind of stimulus. For instance, in the
emotional Stroop task, the participant's task is to ignore the meaning
of a series of words (e.g., wine, table) and respond as quickly and accu-
rately as possible to the color (e.g., red, blue, green, yellow) in which
eachword is presented. Each participant's interference score is calculat-
ed by subtracting the mean reaction time for naming the color of the
neutral words (e.g., table) from the mean reaction time for naming
the color of salient words (e.g., wine). Presumably, the semantic mean-
ing of the salient word takes processing priority over the focus pre-
scribed by the task, the color of the word's font, thus delaying
identification of the color. The interference score is a measure of the
person's attentional bias for the salient category (e.g., alcohol).
Studies suggest that indicants of individuals' cold ECF, such as impul-
sivity or poor inhibitory control, are correlated with their performance
on attentional bias tasks (e.g., Liu et al., 2011). Therefore, it is important
to establishwhether (a) longer response times onmeasures of attentional
bias can be attributed to the substance-related characteristics of the stim-
uli, or (b) longer response times simply result fromparticipants' impaired
ECF. Fadardi and Cox (2006) used a regression model to control for alco-
hol abusers' impaired ECF and concluded that the attentional bias for alco-
hol-related stimuli was not an artifact of the abusers' poorer cognitive
ability. In a study testing the relationship between drinking motives and
drinking-related interpretation biases, Woud, Becker, Rinck, and
Salemink (2015) reported that ECF did not mediate the relationship be-
tween drinking expectancies and drinking-related interpretation biases.
Using various measurement techniques, such as the visual probe
(Field et al., 2007; Schoenmakers, Wiers, Jones, Bruce, & Jansen, 2007),
flicker (Jones, Bruce, Livingstone, & Reed, 2006; Jones, Jones, Smith, &
Copley, 2003; Schoenmakers et al., 2007), dual-task (Waters & Green,
2003), and Stroop (Cox et al., 2006) paradigms; eye-tracking technology
(Friese, Bargas-Avila, Hofmann, &Wiers, 2010); and functional magnet-
ic resonance imaging (fMRI; Vollstadt-Klein et al., 2012), researchers
have documented attentional bias across a wide range of addictive be-
haviors, including alcohol abuse (Fadardi, 2003; Fadardi & Cox, 2008;
Roy-Charland et al., 2016; Sharma, Albery, & Cook, 2001;
Vollstadt-Klein et al., 2012; Wilcockson & Pothos, 2015; Zetteler,
Stollery, Weinstein, & Lingford-Hughes, 2006), heroin addiction
(Bearre, Sturt, Bruce, & Jones, 2007; Waters, Marhe, & Franken, 2012),
cocaine addiction (Castillo et al., 2010; Copersino et al., 2004; Hester,
Dixon, & Garavan, 2006; Kilts et al., 2014; Sokhadze et al., 2008;
Waters et al., 2012), marijuana use (Cousijn et al., 2013; Field, 2005;
van Hemel-Ruiter, Wiers, Brook, & de Jong, 2016; Vujanovic, Wardle,
Liu, Dias, & Lane, 2016), and obesity (Doolan, Breslin, Hanna, &
Gallagher, 2015; Fadardi & Bazzaz, 2011; Freijy, Mullan, & Sharpe,
2014; Lattimore & Mead, 2015; Nathan et al., 2012; Schmitz,
Naumann, Trentowska, & Svaldi, 2014; Werthmann et al., 2015).
In an fMRI study, Ihssen, Cox, Wiggett, Fadardi, and Linden (2011)
exposed heavy drinkers to alcohol-related pictures and to pictures relat-
ed to healthy goal pursuits. They found that the parts of the brain that
are involved in emotional processing (i.e., insular cortex) and reward cir-
cuitry (i.e., ventral striatum) showed greater activation in heavy
drinkers than light drinkers during exposure to the alcohol-related pic-
tures. When presented with the stimuli related to higher-order goals
(suchas those related to family, health, andfinances), the heavy drinkers
showed weaker responses in frontal areas than the light drinkers.
What does increased activity in certain loci of the brain in response to
addiction-related stimuli indicate? Ihssen et al.'s (2011) findings suggest
that heavy drinkers have difficulty forming healthy goals as an alternative
to drinking alcohol. For them, alcohol serves as amajor source of emotion-
al regulation, which means an increased likelihood of relapse after they
attempt to control their drinking. Franken (2003) argued that when ha-
bitual substance users encounter a conditioned drug stimulus, their
brain's dopamine level in the corticostriatal circuit increases, particularly
in the anterior cingulate gyrus, amygdala, and nucleus accumbens. The in-
crease serves two purposes: (a) it draws the person's attention toward a
drug-related stimulus, and (b) it results in motor preparation and hyper-
attentiveness to drug-related stimuli. Together, the activation promotes
substance craving and perhaps relapse. In fact, several studies have con-
cluded that drug-related attentional bias predicts post-treatment relapse
among drug-abusers (Field & Cox, 2008; Goldstein, Woicik, Lukasik,
Maloney, & Volkow, 2007; Marissen et al., 2006).
Evidence on the relationship between attentional bias and substance
abuse and relapse suggests that one's willpower proportionately suffers
from the strength of one's attentional bias for substance-related stimuli.
However, despite extensive literature discussing the importance of at-
tentional bias and its relationship to continued substance use and re-
lapse (Field & Cox, 2008; Field, Munafo, & Franken, 2009), the
evidence for this conclusion is not entirely consistent (Field, Marhe, &
Franken, 2014). It should be noted that such results are based on
group averages; usually the mean score of one group (e.g., heavy
drinkers) was compared with the mean score of another group. In
other words, it is not possible to predict whether individual substance
userswill showanattentional bias, and, even if they do, there is no guar-
antee that their outcome will be determined by their degree of atten-
tional bias (e.g., Flaudias et al., 2013; van Hemel-Ruiter et al., 2016).
Attentional bias apparently interacts with a variety of circumstantial
variables in its relation to subsequent variables, such as substance use
(Field et al., 2016). Nevertheless, studies have shown that attentional
bias training can help substance users reduce their attentional bias for
addiction-related stimuli (Attwood, O'Sullivan, Leonards, Mackintosh,
& Munafo, 2008; Bazzaz, Fadardi, & Parkinson, 2016; Cox et al., 2015;
Field, Duka, Tyler, & Schoenmakers, 2009; Hester et al., 2006; Wiers et
al., 2015a, 2015b; Ziaee, Fadardi, Cox, & Yazdi, 2016).
To conclude, attentional bias can exacerbate an addiction; however,
there are ways to reduce its effects, the simplest of which is to avoid sit-
uations and stimuli that are related to the substance use. Another way is
to practice overcoming the attentional bias using one of the attention
retraining programs that have been specifically developed for this pur-
pose. There is no study to suggest that substance-related attentional
bias can excuse substance users' inability to control their harmful be-
havior. As, however, we show in the subsequent sections, the contribu-
tion of nonconscious processes to addictive behaviors is not limited to
substance-related attentional bias.
8. Interpretation bias
“When youwere talking, he started…”How could one complete this
sentence? Would one say something such as “laughing at you” or per-
haps “looking at you”? What about these sentences: “When we want
to hang out, we go to a supermarket to buy…” “It was late, and she
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came home…”? People's tendency to immediately appraise an ambigu-
ous situation in a given way (whether positive or negative) constitutes
their interpretation bias, but an interpretation bias does not normally
reflect reality (Butler & Mathews, 1983). Like attentional bias, it also
can be modified; this means that it is not completely automatized.
Studying implicit substance-related interpretation biases relies on
implicit paradigms such as word association tasks (e.g., Stacy, Ames, &
Grenard, 2006). Single ambiguous words can be used to study implicit
associations, whereby participants are asked to report their first sponta-
neous response to a given ambiguous cue (e.g., “bar”); alternatively,
ambiguous phrases containing affective components (e.g., “What a spir-
it!”) or open-ended ambiguous scenarios can be used (Woud,
Fitzgerald, Wiers, Rinck, & Becker, 2012; Woud, Hutschemaekers,
Rinck, & Becker, 2015a; Woud et al., 2014; Woud et al., 2015b). The
common finding from this line of research is that people with more al-
cohol-related associations tend to drink more heavily than those with
fewer alcohol-related associations. It seems that the facilitation effect
in alcohol-related associations is a product of both one's history of pro-
curing alcohol and an eliciting factor that promotes craving and future
alcohol use (Woud et al., 2015b, 2015a).
Actually, there have been only a few studies that have tested the re-
lationship between interpretation biases and alcohol or other drug use.
Woud et al. (2012) reported that, compared to light drinkers, excessive
drinkers generated more alcohol-related completions of the sentences.
InWoud et al.'s (2014) study, alcohol-dependent patients showed great-
er alcohol-related interpretation bias and extended the bias to emotion-
ally vague contexts (i.e., potentially related to fear or depression) than
did control patientswho had either a clinically diagnosedmood disorder
or an anxiety disorder. Woud et al. (2015a, 2015b) found that drinkers'
motives for reducing their negative affect (i.e., coping motives) were
the sole predictor of their interpretation bias in favor of drinking alcohol
when theywere exposed to an ambiguous negative context. An example
of such a scenario is: “Your study loan piles up, you failed an exam, and
now you lost your wallet. You just want to forget all your problems.”
Two choiceswere provided for overcoming the problems: drinking alco-
hol or going for a long walk. The participants' bias toward drinking alco-
hol was a significant predictor of their future drinking.
In summary, excessive drinkers tendmore often than light drinkers to
interpret ambiguous, potentially alcohol-related scenarios in an alcohol-
related manner. And there is evidence with alcohol abusers (Woud,
Hutschemaekers, Rinck, & Becker, 2015) that a single session of Cognitive
BiasModification-Interpretation (CBM-I) can produce changes in alcohol-
related interpretation biases. Motivated by the strong evidence for a rela-
tionship between negative affect, frustration intolerance, and substance
use (Bitsakou, Antrop, Wiersema, & Sonuga-Barke, 2006; Ko, Yen, Yen,
Chen, & Wang, 2008; Kraemer, McLeish, & O'Bryan, 2015; McHugh &
Otto, 2012), Samifard, Fadardi, and Shamloo (2016) compared drug-
users in a treatment program with non-abusers on explicit and implicit
measures of frustration intolerance. On both measures, the drug users
scored higher than the non-users. Examples of the scenarios that were
used in the study are as follows: “Occasionally, you join your friends for
walking in the wilderness. In the past, sometimes you have used drugs
with your friends. You are on your way to meet your friends for the
hike. On your way, you think of…” A negative target interpretation was
“On your way, you think of past experiences and want to use drugs”. A
positive target interpretationwas “Onyourway, you think of your bad ex-
periences with drugs, and you decide to stop using them”.
Next, drug-users who scored high on the temptation to use drugs and
lowon frustration tolerancewere randomly allocated to a sham interven-
tion or to an experimental group that received three sessions of CBM-I in
order to alter their frustration-related negative bias. At post-test and a
one-month follow-up, participants again completed the baseline mea-
sures. The results indicated that, compared to the sham intervention
group, the experimental group showed increases in positive, drug-unre-
lated interpretations of ambiguous scenarios and in frustration tolerance,
which were accompanied by reductions in the temptation to use drugs.
Thefindings suggest that the use of CBM-I to promote positive interpreta-
tions can have clinical implications in the treatment of drug use. In other
words, cognitive bias modification programs are a means of helping sub-
stance users to facilitate their motivation to control their harmful habit;
however, making such a decision is a matter of their own choice.
9. Conclusions regarding cognitive automaticity and free choice
Due not only to the adverse effects of substance use but also to the
development of various types of cognitive biases, a substance abuser's
brain suffers from a distortion in the flow of higher-order cognitive pro-
cesses, including concentration and working memory, which might re-
duce the person's ability to exercise reflective processes over impulsive
processes, hence disrupting controlled patterns of substance use.When
executive cognitive functions that are responsible for reflective process-
es are impaired, the effects of various types of cognitive biases on drink-
ing-related decisions can be multiplied. A cognitive bias, therefore, can
lead a substance user tomake decisions in favor of substance use despite
the person's conscious vows to refrain from the use. Factors that
strengthen implicit processes contribute to the person's choosing im-
mediate goals over more long-term goals (Lewis, 2011).
Although implicit processes, such as those described here, can out-
weigh the impact of reflective processes in substance-related decisions
and behaviors, substance use is not necessarily ruled predominantly by
implicit processes. In fact, there is a general consensus among addiction
researchers that if an individual has the necessary motivation and cog-
nitive resources, the impact of implicit processes can be regulated
(Becker et al., 2016; Belackova, Maalste, Zabransky, & Grund, 2015;
Petry, 2005; Woud et al., 2015b, 2015a). The resulting decisions would
exemplify the exercise of free will as this article defines it.
10. Conclusions
We take the view that the natural course of events entails causes and
effects. Although, within the present state of our knowledge, there will
be some unpredictable, seemingly random variation in behavior, this
random variation cannot be meaningfully equated with human free
will. People can, however, make choices from among an assortment of
possibilities that are unconstrained by physical limits or significant so-
cial pressures. Making a choice from among such options might, in
this limited sense, be viewed as having been made freely, even though
the choice was predictable.
Within the present theory, the value component of decision-making
depends on immediate or anticipated affective responses to the alterna-
tives, regardless of whether these are to anticipated physical pleasures,
to the conditioned inner consequences of obeying or violating moral
principles, or to some other source of affective arousal. Various kinds
of brain impairments, psychopathologies, and personality traits such
as impulsiveness also affect decision processes. Repeated substance
use itself risks physical, emotional, and social changes that may weight
decision processes against cessation of use, evenwhen the addict recog-
nizes that cessation would carry benefits, although possibly just not
enough to outweigh the experiential benefits of continued use. The
present review of choices that are available to an individual about
whether to use an addictive substancemakes it clear that once a person
has become addicted, ceasing to use the substance constitutes an often
extremely difficult and improbable choice; nevertheless, cessation of
the use is not impossible. The present review also makes it clear that
the behaviors entailed in obtaining and consuming an addictive sub-
stance cannot be construed as entirely automatic or quasi-mechanical,
in that they are to some extent flexible and sometimes even creative.
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the components involved in
seeking an addictive substance and wanting to use it can at least to
some extent be modified by appropriate treatment techniques.
The component that is most difficult to change is the goal to use the
addictive substance, once it has become firmly established. It, in turn,
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guides the motivational, cognitive, and emotional components of the
subsequent substance-seeking behavior. Despite their recalcitrance, ad-
diction-related goals can be changed, or at least suppressed and
superceded by other goals, often without any formal treatment but
also within an empirically validated treatment program. In this limited
sense, people indeed are free to choose whether or not to use an addic-
tive substance.
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